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In the unfolding process of the Korean financial cri-
sis in 1997, an inefficient corporate bankruptcy sys-
tem played a damaging role in the Korean economy.
Before the crisis, in 1996 and during the first three
quarters of 1997, numerous large firms faced with
bankruptcy actively sought shelter under court-ad-
ministered rehabilitation procedures. However,
Korea’s poor bankruptcy system failed to maintain
the most advantageous order among the increasingly
large number of financially distressed firms as they
were targeted to undergo the rehabilitation procedure.
Uncertainty and delay in dealing with failing firms
added to the distortion in the economy’s resource al-
location process before the crisis broke out.
In other words, the exit barriers for large firms seemed
to have decreased the efficiency of resource alloca-
tion before the onset of the crisis. Before the crisis,
the Korean corporate bankruptcy system had a ten-
dency to work as a de facto exit barrier. For example,
before the reform, producers with persistently de-
clining productivity were much more likely to be ac-
cepted in some rehabilitation procedures if they were
regarded as having “high social value” such as sig-
nificant production or employment.
Thus, it was natural for postcrisis Korea to launch a
sweeping reform of the corporate bankruptcy sys-
tem. As was the case with other structural reforms in
the corporate sector, the reform of bankruptcy policy
was pushed forward because of the belief that re-
form was essential for preventing recurrent economic
crises from plaguing Korea’s economy.
In the next section, the corporate bankruptcy system
in Korea before the economic crisis is explained; then
key elements of the postcrisis bankruptcy reforms
are discussed. This is followed by conclusions.
Corporate Bankruptcy System before the
Economic Crisis
Statutes Contributed to Exit Barriers for Large
Firms
Past economic growth in Korea had been possible
through the growth or restructuring of existing firms
instead of through the dynamic process of entry and
exit. In the developmental era, when profitable new
markets were emerging rapidly, the poor corporate
bankruptcy system did not significantly distort the
resource allocation of the economy because resources
could be easily reallocated from declining sectors to
emerging profitable sectors. Under these circum-
stances, through rationalization programs, the gov-
ernment played an active role in reallocating resources
from failing firms to other existing firms. During the
developmental era, most failing firms did not use the
bankruptcy procedures that were overseen by the
courts.1
In particular, most small and medium-sized bankrupt
firms were effectively liquidated on a nonjudicial ba-
sis. The debt of a bankrupt firm was usually collected
individually under the Civil Procedure Act. Most as-
sets of the bankrupt firms were already subject to
mortgage or to security, and few assets were left for
unsecured creditors. Additional procedures for the
collection of debt were not needed.
1. One technical hurdle to the use of judicial bankruptcy procedures was the Act on Special Measures for Unpaid Loans of Financial
Institutions, which gave the Korea Asset Management Corporation (KAMCO) the authority to auction off assets of bankrupt firms
before court procedures began. In practice, this act prevented the Corporate Reorganization Act from operating because the auction
of assets by KAMCO effectively preempted the corporate reorganization process. In 1990, the Constitutional Court declared uncon-
stitutional this provision of the Act on Special Measures for Unpaid Loans of Financial Institutions, which paved the way for the
wider use of judicial bankruptcy procedures.
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For large firms, however, the too-big-to-fail argument
played a role as an exit barrier in the sense that ineffi-
cient firms were often allowed to operate with some
explicit or hidden subsidies from the government. Some
large, bankrupt firms were periodically bailed out by
the government through various rationalization mea-
sures. Such measures—for example, those undertaken
in the mid-1980s—also undercut the use of formal
bankruptcy procedures.
Beginning in the early 1990s, the poor corporate bank-
ruptcy system began to distort the resource alloca-
tion process of the economy. The distortion grew until
the outbreak of the financial crisis in 1997. Some fail-
ing firms began to use court-administered bankruptcy
procedures, but the court-administered bankruptcy
system was often abused by the controlling share-
holders of failing firms.
By laying down the Rule on Corporate Reorganiza-
tion Procedure in 1992, the Supreme Court began to
move in the direction of improving judicial bankruptcy
procedures. Among other things, the new rules es-
tablished the conditions for the initiation of corporate
reorganization proceedings. These included high so-
cial value, financial distress, and the possibility of re-
habilitation.2 This new rule established the tendency
for court-ordered corporate bankruptcy settlements
to function as de facto exit barriers for large firms.
For example, producers with persistently declining
productivity were much more likely to be accepted
into the rehabilitation program if they were regarded
as having high social value, which was defined as
significant production or employment.
Controlling Shareholders of Failing Firms
Created Exit Barriers
Before the economic crisis, controlling shareholders
of large but failing firms often sought shelter under
court-administered rehabilitation procedures. However,
an inefficient bankruptcy system failed to maintain
discipline in selecting from among an increasingly large
number of financially distressed firms the best firms
to target for rehabilitation.
Some notorious episodes of abuse of the corporate
reorganization procedure by the controlling sharehold-
ers of failing firms led the Supreme Court to amend
the system in 1996. In particular, the court argued
that the shares of controlling shareholders respon-
sible for a firm’s failure should be wiped out. This
revision produced an unanticipated outcome: the own-
ers of failing firms looked for other possibilities that
would allow them to maintain their control.
They found such an alternative in the composition
procedure. The composition procedure was originally
designed for small and medium-sized firms with simple
capital structures, but there was no explicit limit on
firm size until the law was revised later. What made
the composition procedure popular was the fact that
the existing management maintained control.
As shown in Table 1, filings for composition exploded
from 9 cases in 1996, to 322 cases in 1997, to 728
cases in 1998. In the first three quarters of 1997,
before the onset of the crisis, many large firms fac-
ing bankruptcy sought to file for the composition pro-
cedure. Among these firms, the case of Kia Motors
deserves special mention because it played an impor-
tant role in the unfolding crisis in mid-1997. The debtor
(Kia) and the creditors initially wanted to apply for
different procedures: Kia initially filed for composi-
tion, but shortly thereafter the creditors chose to file
for corporate reorganization. When both procedures
were filed in this way, the filing for corporate reorga-
nization overrode the one for composition. In the end,
the court accepted Kia Motors into corporate reorga-
nization, but the uncertainty and delay in dealing with
large, failing firms such as Kia clearly added to the
uncertainty in the economy before the crisis broke
out.
Postcrisis Bankruptcy Policy Reforms
The economic crisis of 1997 put the existing corpo-
rate bankruptcy system, both judicial and nonjudicial,
under great strain. The number and scale of bank-
ruptcies soared. Table 1 shows that the filings for
2. Economic efficiency was not a requirement for corporate reorganization.
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judicial bankruptcy procedures rose dramatically in
1997. This internal pressure on the system was a driv-
ing force behind the changes in laws and procedures
although the International Monetary Fund and the In-
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and Development
also demanded improvement in the corporate bank-
ruptcy system as a condition for a program of finan-
cial support.
After the economic crisis, the Korean government
made reform efforts to remove exit barriers along two
separate lines: one has been the court-administered
bankruptcy procedure, and a second has been the in-
formal pre-bankruptcy arrangements for corporate
restructuring. The workout procedure has played an
important role in dealing with the largest failing firms,
and the court-administered bankruptcy system has
had an impact on the way medium-sized failing firms
are restructured.
In this paper we focus on the policy reforms in the
court-administered bankruptcy system. Except for
small firms with simple capital structures, the court-
administered bankruptcy procedures would usually
take place in the final stages; failing firms could re-
sort to them if interested parties could not agree on
the informal pre-bankruptcy arrangements for cor-
porate restructuring. For the informal pre-bankruptcy
arrangements, one of the most effective disciplines
should come from the court-administered bankruptcy
procedures. In this sense, the court-administered
bankruptcy system plays a crucial role in the whole
bankruptcy system. In settlements administered out
of court, the interested parties’ incentives would be
directly affected by the structure of court-adminis-
tered bankruptcy settlements.
1998: Economic Efficiency Criterion and
Removal of Exit Barriers for Large Firms
The most important element in the postcrisis court-
administered bankruptcy system has been the eco-
nomic efficiency criterion. The court established an
economic efficiency criterion that firms were required
to meet in order to qualify for judicial bankruptcy pro-
cedures. The court implemented this tightly. The old
system had been based on high social value and pros-
pects for rehabilitation, but the new system consid-
ered the additional requirement of economic efficiency.
Now it is required that the value of a distressed firm
as a going concern must be compared with its liqui-
dation value before any judicial bankruptcy proceed-
ings can be initiated.
This new criterion contributed much to removing the
de facto exit barrier for large firms that had existed in
the precrisis court-administered bankruptcy system.
Remember that, in the prior system, the producers
with persistently declining productivity were much
more likely to be accepted into a rehabilitation proce-
dure if they were regarded as having high social value
such as significant production or employment.
Table 1: Bankruptcy Filings in Korea, 1995–2002
   Bankruptcy procedure                   1995                              1996                               1997                               1998
              Number     Percent      Number     Percent      Number       Percent      Number      Percent
Reorganization 79 76.0 52 65.8 132 26.8 148 14.9
Composition 13 12.5 9 11.4 322 65.5 728 73.3
Liquidation 12 11.5 18 22.8 38 7.7 117 11.8
Total 104 100.0 79 100.0 492 100.0 993 100.0
   Bankruptcy procedure                   1999                               2000                               2001                               2002a
                                            Number      Percent      Number     Percent       Number      Percent      Number      Percent
Reorganization 37 9.1 32 13.2 31 12.3 19 15.3
Composition 140 34.4 78 32.2 51 20.2 23 18.6
Liquidation 230 56.5 132 54.6 170 67.5 82 66.1
Total 407 100.0 242 100.0 252 100.0 124 100.0
Source: Supreme Court of Korea.
a. From January to October.
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The 1998 revision represented the most substantial
change in the system since the enactment of the cor-
porate bankruptcy laws in 1962. But, because the
government was pressed for time in the wake of the
crisis, it did not succeed in initiating a fully compre-
hensive revision; this fact accounts for the second
round of reform in 1999. Through these two revi-
sions, the role of the courts in the corporate bank-
ruptcy process increased significantly. If it had not
been for the workout procedure introduced as an out-
of-court settlement process in 1998, the role of the
courts would have even been even larger.
Besides the economic efficiency criterion, the 1998
revision tried to speed up proceedings. Time limits
were introduced for critical steps in the proceedings,
including the issuance of stays, the report of debts
and equities, and the approval of the reorganization
plan. Other important changes in the 1998 revision
included:
• Establishment of a creditors’ conference in order
to induce a more active role for the creditors;
• Introduction of a court receivership committee as
a special adviser on the critical steps in the pro-
ceedings in order to enhance the capacity of the
court to deal with bankruptcy cases;
• Strengthening and making more transparent the
process of wiping out the shares of controlling
shareholders; and
• Alteration of the Composition Act in order to pre-
vent abuse of the composition procedure, and to
prevent large firms with complicated capital struc-
tures from entering composition; Table 1 shows
the impact of this change: the number of composi-
tion filings decreased sharply from 728 in 1998 to
140 in 1999.
1999: Mandatory Liquidation System
Despite these changes, the 1998 revision left room
for further reform. In fact, to some extent the 1999
revision filled the gap between initial reform propos-
als and what was eventually passed in the 1998 revi-
sion. In the 1999 revision process, there was initially
a debate on the inclusion of an automatic stay in the
new law. Under an automatic stay, the debtors’ as-
sets upon filing are automatically protected from the
creditors’ rush to secure their claims. The pros and
cons of the automatic stay were both strong. The
final compromise was to speed up the initiation of the
proceedings to take place no later than one month
after the filing.
On the one hand, an automatic stay can contribute to
the rehabilitation of failing firms after bankruptcy. On
the other hand, a debtor might use the court to avoid
a formal default and thereby evade criminal punish-
ment under the Illegal Check Control Act. According
to the Illegal Check Control Act, which was devel-
oped to overcome the informational asymmetry be-
tween the debtor and the creditors, the managers or
owners of failing firms who issued bad checks were
to be held criminally liable. Dealing with highly unre-
liable accounting information, creditors would be
much less willing to lend money to debtors without
such recourse. The debtors are in effect forced to
make a credible commitment to repayment by risking
incarceration in case of default.
The new revision also facilitated an efficient transi-
tion between corporate reorganization and liquidation.
After the initiation decision, the court must compare
the value of the firm as a going concern with its liqui-
dation value. If the liquidation value turns out to be
larger than the going-concern value, the court must
declare liquidation of the firm. Donga Construction
was the first large firm to go down this path; the
company was liquidated in early 2001. This change
could be regarded as one that contributes to an effi-
cient working of the market mechanism.
The system of mandatory liquidation for failing firms
produced an unintended outcome: failing firms did
not want to use the judicial rehabilitation procedures
because they feared the possibility of forced
liquidation.3
3. The system of mandatory liquidation for failing firms was relaxed several years later.
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2005: Unified Bankruptcy Act
Bankruptcy policy reforms in 1998–99 emphasized
the implementation of the economic efficiency crite-
rion to qualify for judicial bankruptcy procedures.
However, one of the serious side effects of the
postcrisis bankruptcy policy reforms was that failing
firms did not want to use the judicial rehabilitation
procedures because controlling shareholders and
management feared the possibility of losing control.
Resolving this problem remained one of the major
future tasks in the Korean judicial bankruptcy sys-
tem. To address this problem, the Unified Bankruptcy
Act was passed in the National Assembly in 2005, to
take effect in April 2006. As in the bankruptcy pro-
cess in Germany, the Unified Bankruptcy Act com-
bines the Corporate Reorganization Act, the Compo-
sition Act, and the Liquidation Act although the total
consolidation of the individual bankruptcy acts remains
incomplete.
The most important feature of the Unified Bankruptcy
Act is the reintroduction of the debtor-in-possession
(DIP) system, which was discarded after the crisis
in Korea. The Supreme Court is eager to see the suc-
cessful reintroduction of the DIP system and the ac-
tive use of in-court bankruptcy procedures by failing
firms.
Concluding Remarks
As discussed in the prior section, the most important
element in the postcrisis court-administered bank-
ruptcy system was the implementation of the eco-
nomic efficiency criterion. The court established an
economic efficiency criterion that firms had to meet
in order to qualify for judicial bankruptcy procedures,
and it implemented that criterion tightly. A compari-
son of the value of a distressed firm as a going con-
cern with its liquidation value is now required for the
initiation of all judicial bankruptcy proceedings.
Instead of economic efficiency, the old system was
based on high social value and prospects for rehabili-
tation. Note that the prospects for rehabilitation could
vary depending on the size of subsidies from the credi-
tors and the government. Compared with the old sys-
tem, the new system removed the opportunity for
interested parties (for example, controlling sharehold-
ers, labor unions, local governments, and the central
government) to resist the exit of the firms without
economic value. In other words, the new system
contributed much to removing the de facto exit bar-
rier for large firms that had existed in the in-court
bankruptcy system before the crisis. Under the new
system, producers with persistent declining produc-
tivity were less likely to be accepted into a rehabilita-
tion procedure despite being regarded as having high
social value.
Successful reform of court-administered bankruptcy
procedures has made a large impact on the success
of corporate restructuring in general. Faced with bank-
ruptcies, failing firms resort to in-court settlements
only after exhausting all the possibilities for out-of-
court settlements. Maintaining discipline in the court-
administered bankruptcy system has had far-reach-
ing consequences on the out-of-court bankruptcy
system because the discipline of the court-adminis-
tered settlements has worked as an effective and cred-
ible threat to failing firms in other stages.
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